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Introduction 
BSkyB has dominated the UK’s pay-TV industry
since its inception more than a decade ago.  As
Britain’s, and Europe’s, largest pay-TV company it
has also been under the near-continuous scrutiny of
European regulatory and competition policy
authorities since at least 1994. It came as no great
surprise, therefore, when the Office of Fair Trading
(OFT) launched its current Competition Act inquiry
into the company’s wholesale pricing (and other)
practices late last year. The stated purpose of this
investigation is to determine whether BSkyB’s
position in the pay-TV market is having a damaging
effect on competition. The clear focus, however, is
on the contracts under which BSkyB resells so-
called “premium programming” to its competitors
in the UK’s pay-TV retail market.
When the authors were asked by one of BSkyB’s
competitors to advise on their response to the OFT
inquiry, we felt that an economic analysis of
BSkyB’s controversial contractual arrangements
with its competitors was long overdue. The purpose
of this article is to describe the results of that
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analysis, and our recommended remedies for the
competition policy problems diagnosed. 1
The UK Pay-TV Market
Pay-TV companies in Britain compete by acquiring
the rights to broadcast programming and selling
subscriptions to viewers. The companies’ products
are differentiated both in terms of the programming
packages they offer, and in the means of delivery.
There are three types of pay-TV network currently
operating in the UK: the satellite network run by
BSkyB with approximately 53% of UK subscribers,
local cable networks with 37% of subscribers,2 and
a digital terrestrial network operated by the most
recent entrant, ITV Digital.
Each company offers various packages of  “basic”
programming, one of which must be taken by all
subscribers. “Premium programming” - typically
major sports events and Hollywood movies - can
then be purchased for an additional monthly fee.
Access to premium programming is widely viewed
as being crucial for attracting customers. As
Armstrong (1999) notes: “premium programming,
where BSkyB currently holds an extremely strong
position, is the major driver of subscriptions.''3
As the first entrant in the pay-TV market, BSkyB
early on acquired the exclusive broadcasting rights
to practically all of the Hollywood studios’ first-run
films, and to the majority of the major sports events
available to pay-TV. BSkyB purchases these rights
under exclusive vertical contracts with upstream
rights sellers, and then resells the programming to
its downstream competitors for variable, or per
subscriber, fees.
                                               
1  For a more detailed treatment the reader is referred to
our paper “Contracts and Competition in the Pay-TV
Market” (Harbord and Ottaviani, 2001).
2  The two largest are NTL and Telewest.
3  There is strong evidence that the acquisition of
premium programming rights confers monopoly
power on broadcasters. See Monopolies and Mergers
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For example, the UK's Premier League has sold the
exclusive rights to broadcast live football matches
to UK pay-TV companies in periodic auctions since
1992.4 BSkyB has so far always acquired these
rights, and has resold the programming to its retail
competitors for a per subscriber monthly fee. The
implications of these contractual arrangements for
competition in the pay-TV market have been
debated fiercely - and often - in various regulatory
inquiries, but are not yet well-understood.
To address these issues we undertook an economic
analysis of competition in the pay-TV market using
a simple model inspired by the current market
situation in the UK. Our purpose was to gain an
understanding of how different contractual
arrangements for the sale and resale of premium
broadcasting rights would affect downstream
competition in the pay-TV market, the distribution
of rents between upstream rights owners and
downstream pay-TV companies, and overall
economic welfare. 
Our point of departure was a recent paper by
Oxford economist Mark Armstrong (Armstrong,
1999) which analyses competition in the pay-TV
market in the context of a classic Hotelling model
of duopoly price competition.5 This model captures
quite well a number of the key features of the pay-
TV market, and of the market for premium
programming in particular:  (i) downstream price
competition is between firms with differentiated
products;  (ii) the acquisition of premium
programming increases the attractiveness of a
company's package to subscribers; and (iii) failure
to obtain access to premium programming when
other firms do results in a loss because other firms'
products become relatively more attractive and they
attract a larger share of subscribers.
                                               
4  Harbord and Binmore (2000) discuss these auctions.
Cave and Crandall (2001) provide an overview of the
role of sports rights in the pay-TV market. 
5  The Hotelling model is widely used by economists to
study competition in a variety of market settings, and
most recently, network access pricing. See especially
Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998).
In Armstrong's model, pay-TV companies compete
initially to sell basic programming to customers.
One firm - the “industry leader” - is assumed either
more efficient than its rival, or else to have
previously acquired a more attractive package of
basic programming. 
When the rights to some type of premium
programming (e.g. Premier League football
matches) become available in an upstream market,
the outcome of the sale of the rights has a
substantial impact on the competitive balance in the
downstream retail  market. A pay-TV firm which
acquires the exclusive rights to the premium
programming obtains a competitive advantage over
its rival, and the rival suffers a loss - a “negative
externality” in economist’s parlance. Competition
to purchase the rights can therefore be modelled as
an auction with “externalities” in which
downstream competition is affected by the outcome
of the auction.6
In the absence of the resale of premium
programming, the industry leader's willingness to
pay for the rights in the upstream market exceeds
that of its smaller rival, hence it will always acquire
the rights in an auction. Armstrong considers what
would happen if the industry leader were able to
resell the programming to its downstream retail
competitor for a fixed fee (i.e. a lump sum
payment), and concludes that reselling would never
take place since it would reduce the competitive
advantage of the industry leader. Although the
smaller downstream firm, and its consumers, would
benefit from having access to the premium product,
this gain is less than the industry leader's loss in
competitive advantage from reselling. Hence
reselling will typically be welfare enhancing, but
not privately profitable, when resale contracts are
restricted in this fashion.
We extended Armstrong's analysis by allowing
downstream pay-TV retailers to resell premium
programming obtained under an exclusive vertical
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contract for variable, or per subscriber fees, and
obtained strikingly different conclusions. We found
that reselling via per subscriber fees will always
occur when the exclusive rights are originally
purchased for either lump sum or per subscriber
fees from the upstream rights seller, and that this
can have profound effects on the nature of
competition in the pay-TV market. Our analysis
thus predicts that reselling will take place under
precisely the conditions observed in the UK market.
Like Armstrong's analysis, our model also predicts
that the upstream rights seller will prefer exclusive
to nonexclusive contracts with downstream firms.
Effects of Resale Contracts on
Downstream Competition
The key result of our analysis is that downstream
competition to supply premium programming to
consumers will be ineffective when resale contracts
specify per subscriber rather than lump sum (i.e.
fixed) fees. Reselling for per subscriber fees means
that all consumers in the market will be served, thus
avoiding one of the contracting inefficiencies
identified by Armstrong. It does so, however, in a
manner which does not dissipate the monopoly
rents available from the sale of premium
programming. Resale for per subscriber fees allows
a downstream firm which acquires the exclusive
rights to prevent the dissipation of downstream
profits by increasing the marginal cost of its
competitor, i.e. by raising rivals’ costs, while
simultaneously increasing the opportunity cost of
serving its own customers. This increased
opportunity cost has exactly the same effect as an
increase in the reselling firm's marginal costs, and
gives both firms an incentive to increase their retail
prices to monopolistic levels.
The intuition behind the opportunity cost effect is
easily explained. Given a resale contract, any
revenues the reselling firm could earn from
reducing its retail price in order to attract its rival’s
customers come at the expense of the resale revenue
it would otherwise have received from its rival’s
subscribers. This reduction in resale revenues - an
opportunity cost - has exactly the same effect as an
increase in the reselling firm's marginal costs,
giving it a strong incentive to maintain a high retail
price in equilibrium.
The resale price thus acts as an effective mechanism
for relaxing downstream price competition and
extracting consumer surplus from the premium
product. In fact, in our model, the highest resale fee
which can be implemented extracts all of the
surplus available from selling the premium good to
consumers, and this surplus accrues initially to the
reselling firm. Consumers are therefore deprived of
the benefits of competition. It is as if the premium
programming market were monopolized by a single
firm, and consumers would prefer a ban on resale
contracts, even though this typically reduces social
welfare.
If instead the premium programming were sold by
both downstream firms who faced “uninflated”
marginal costs, i.e. if both firms acquired the rights
for a lump sum fee, fierce downstream competition
to sell the programming to consumers would result
in these profits being competed away, and the
benefits captured by consumers. This observation
suggests that one remedy for the competition
problem identified would be to regulate the way in
which premium programming rights are sold and
resold.
Effects of Resale Contracts on Upstream
Competition
Another conclusion of our analysis is that an
upstream rights seller such as the UK’s Premier
League will usually prefer to sell programming
rights exclusively to one downstream firm, rather
than nonexclusively to all firms. Exclusive sale -
followed by resale - maximises the monopoly rents
available for distribution between the upstream
seller and the downstream retailer which acquires
the rights, thus increasing downstream firms’
willingness to pay. Nonexclusive sale, on the other
hand, typically extracts less surplus for both the
upstream rights seller and the downstream firms.
Given that sports and other programming rights are
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pay-TV companies, our analysis therefore predicts
two key features of competition in the UK pay-TV
market, i.e. the form of the premium programming
rights sale and resale contracts.
Related Literature
Although our conclusions were derived from a
specific model of competition between pay-TV
companies, which abstracts from many potentially
relevant features of the industry, they are not
entirely novel, and similar results have been shown
to hold in other contexts. The well-known papers by
Salop and Scheffman (1983), (1987) and
Krattenmaker and Salop (1986) are standard
references on raising the costs of competitors via
the sale of an essential input, and have obvious
relevance here.
The most closely related results, however, come
from the literature on patent licensing, especially in
papers by the noted US antitrust economists
Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro.7 
Katz and Shapiro (1985) considered a model in
which the owner of a cost-reducing innovation may
license it to a rival firm for a fixed fee, a per unit
charge (i.e. a royalty rate) or under a two part tariff.
The two firms then compete a′ la Cournot in a
homogeneous product final goods market.
Licensing for a fixed fee to a rival firm is not
always in the interest of the licensor in this model,
for the same reason that resale of premium
programming rights for a lump sum fee is not
always profitable in our model. Katz and Shapiro
also considered variable fee, or  per unit, licensing
contracts and found that there is always a variable
fee licensing agreement which is preferred by both
firms to the ‘no licensing’ alternative. 
                                               
7  Shapiro served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General
for Economics in the Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice during the Clinton
Administration. Katz served as Chief Economist to
the Federal Communications Commission from
1994-96.
As Shapiro (1985) explains, a firm which possesses
the rights to a cost-reducing innovation can use
licensing agreements (or resale contracts) with its
rivals to prevent downstream competition from
dissipating the potential monopoly rents, and in
extreme cases to implement a collusive agreement.
The latter occurs when the licensor imposes a very
high per unit royalty rate on its rival, forcing it to
reduce its output to zero. A fixed fee can then be
used as a “bribe” to induce the licensee to accept
the output reduction.
The main difference between the Katz and Shapiro
analysis and our own is that, in their model, a per
subscriber fee induces firms to produce exactly the
same outputs they would have in the absence of a
resale agreement, thus sharing some of the benefits
of the cost-reducing innovation with consumers. A
negative fixed fee (i.e. a bribe), is required to
compensate the rival for reducing its output further,
and increasing the market price to the collusive
level. 
In our analysis, a per subscriber resale fee induces
both firms to increase their retail prices. The resale
contract results in both firms producing the same
outputs they would have in the absence of the
premium programming being available, while retail
prices increase by the willingness to pay of
consumers for the premium product. Per subscriber
resale fees therefore extract all of the rents from the
availability of premium programming, and
consumers would be better off in the absence of
resale contracts altogether. 
The key point, however, is that both the analyses of
Katz and Shapiro and our own reveal the
anticompetitive effects which may arise from
licensing or resale contracts which specify per
subscriber charges. Such contracts dampen
downstream price competition and allow the
reselling firm - via raising rivals’ costs and, in our
model, its own opportunity costs - to avoid the rent
dissipating effects that licensing for a fixed fee
would induce. Monopoly power is thus extended
downstream and consumers may receive little or no
benefit from the innovation or premium
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Remedies
Our analysis identified a clear competition policy
concern in BSkyB’s resale contracts with its retail
competitors in the pay-TV market. We therefore
considered a number of possible remedies, at least
one of which has already been tried by the UK
regulatory authorities:
  forced ‘rights splitting’, or forced divestiture of
premium programming rights 
  direct regulation of the resale price
  forced ‘rights sharing’, or resale of premium
programming for lump sum fees
  a ban on exclusive vertical contracts
Forced rights splitting had no effect on pricing,
profits or consumer welfare, at least in our model.
Splitting the exclusive rights between the two
downstream firms simply creates two downstream
monopolies in the place of one. It does not differ,
therefore, from the case in which the exclusive
rights are sold to a single firm. Since this remedy
has recently been used in the pay-TV market, this
demonstrates the importance of undertaking a more
rigorous market analysis.8
Our other remedies proved more efficacious. Direct
regulation of the resale price has the effect of
dividing the surplus created by the premium
programming between firms and consumers. A ban
on exclusive vertical contracts - equivalent to forced
rights sharing for lump sum fees - likewise transfers
the social benefits of premium programming from
firms to consumers, but does so by intensifying
downstream competition. In more realistic versions
of the model, this procompetitive remedy also
increases aggregate social welfare.
                                               
8  During the most recent auction for Premier League
broadcasting rights, the OFT intervened to ensure
that the rights were split into a package of pay-per-
view rights and non-pay-per-view rights, with no
company permitted to win the auctions for both
packages.
Conclusions
Our analysis of competition in the pay-TV market
predicts that premium programming rights will be
sold originally under exclusive vertical contracts
and then resold by the acquiring firm for per
subscriber fees to its competitors. The resale of
premium programming for per subscriber fees has
the effect of relaxing downstream price
competition, providing incentives for both
downstream firms to increase their prices at the
expense of consumers. The profits created by these
contractual arrangements are initially captured by
the reselling firm, and then at least partially
transferred upstream to the original rights
monopolist.
Our model thus predicts a number of the key
features of competition in the UK pay-TV market,
and in particular the form of the rights selling and
resale contracts. The key conclusion for
competition policy purposes is that these vertical
and horizontal contracts may actually harm
consumers compared to the case of no resale, in
which some consumers do not get served.
In an extension of this analysis we considered what
happens when resale contracts specify wholesale
prices for premium programming which are
proportional to retail prices, as occurs under the so-
called ‘DTH linkage’ in BSkyB’s contracts with its
competitors (see Office of Fair Trading, 1996). We
found that such ‘retail price proportional’ resale
contracts are worse for consumers than the simpler
resale contracts we considered initially. When the
reselling firm is able to commit itself to a
proportional resale pricing scheme this results in
even higher equilibrium profits and prices and
lower consumer welfare. This is because when the
reselling firm reduces its retail price in order to
attract its rival’s customers, this not only results in a
reduction in its resale revenue via the opportunity
cost effect described above, it also reduces the
resale price directly via the DTH linkage. This
makes price competition to gain market share at the
expense of rivals still more costly, and hence less
attractive. HARBORD AND OTTAVIANI:  ANTICOMPETITIVE CONTRACTS IN THE PAY-TV MARKET
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Proportional resale pricing, as currently practised
by BSkyB, therefore appears to be an even more
effective mechanism for softening downstream
price competition and extracting consumer surplus
from both premium and basic programming.
Indeed, under this type of resale pricing consumers
may actually be worse off than they would have
been had the premium programming never been
made available.
The clear message for the current OFT investigation
is that a continuation of its ‘light-handed’ regulation
of BSkyB’s wholesale prices via oversight of its
industry ‘ratecard’ will not be sufficient. The form
of the rights selling contracts themselves – both
upstream and downstream – is at the heart of the
competition problem, and needs to be addressed. 
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